Homeownership, Shareownership And Coalition Policy by Donoghue, Jed et al.
HOMEOWNERSHIP, SHAREOWNERSHIP 
AND COALITION POLICY 
Jed Donoghue, Bruce Tranter and Robert White 
The rise in private shareownership has been a striking feature of 
Australia’s political economy over the last decade.  This paper compares 
its implications with those arising from the widespread homeownership, 
that occurred from the Menzies years onwards. 
Noting an apparent similarity between Menzies’ vision of Australia as a 
‘home owning democracy’ and Howard’s encouragement of Australians 
to see themselves as members of a ‘share owning democracy,’ Troy 
(2000: 736) points out that Howard: 
does not seem to recognise that there are significant differences in 
the levels of citizen competence between the two conceptions.  In 
his notion of a home owning democracy Menzies lauded notions 
of security, continuity, predictability and community whereas the 
notion of a share owning democracy implies a more mobile, 
speculative response to society and its fabric. 
As Troy (2000) observes, the Coalition would not advance policies on 
private shareownership without the hope of electoral advantage.  This 
expectation in itself is worth attention, since it has been little studied in 
the literature.  The electoral implications of increased shareownership in 
Australia are a primary concern of this paper.  In addition, we test Troy’s 
suggestions that homeownership and shareownership imply very 
different expressions of ‘social citizenship’ or ‘civic engagement’ and 
that shareownership may ‘weaken’ rather than ‘deepen’ the quality of 
community life (Howard 1999). 
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We first note tensions between notions of property ‘ownership’ and 
‘civic engagement’.  As many social commentators have noted, (e.g. 
Marshall 1950; Barbalet 1988; Turner 1993; Connell 2002) there are 
contradictions between the capitalist acquisition and ownership of 
property and the communal membership and participation of citizenship.  
After sketching Coalition positions on the two forms of ownership and 
showing the material changes that have accompanied them, we use data 
from the 2001 Australian Election Study (Bean et al. 2002) to examine 
their implications.  Comparisons of homeowners and shareowners show 
that they are electorally and civically distinct.  Electorally, the Coalition 
appears justified in its expectations about shareholders, for the evidence 
shows them to be about twice as likely to support it as non-shareowners.  
By contrast, homeownership is not electorally significant, with the 
exception of those living in public rental housing who tend to support 
Labor over the Coalition.   
Our analysis lends support to Troy’s (2000) suggestion that homeowners 
and shareholders differ on a range of measures of civic engagement.  It 
seems then that rising shareownership does not bridge the social 
divisions as envisaged in Coalition policy.  These mixed results for the 
Coalition are also mixed results for the ALP.  While Coalition supporters 
are more likely to buy into the share market, once in, they become even 
more likely to vote for the Coalition parties.  If the pool of share 
investors has reached a natural limit, as the stock exchange data 
indicates, the potential benefit for the Coalition of pursuing such a policy 
may also have peaked.  Given the strength of private investors’ support 
for the Coalition, however, ALP advocates of shareownership, like Mark 
Latham, also need to reassess their policies. 
Homeownership, Shareownership and Liberal Policy 
The rise in shareownership in Australia puts a classical problem back on 
the liberal-democratic agenda: the place of ‘ownership’ in the 
reconciliation of individualism and collectivity.  From Locke to neo-
liberalism and the sight of people ‘bowling alone’ (Dean and Hindess 
1998; Putnam 2000), ‘citizenship’ has been linked with private 
‘ownership’ (e.g. Marshall 1950; Barbalet 1988).  Ownership is both a 
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mark of social membership and the entry ticket to political participation, 
and liberal politicians have seen its development as a prime obligation of 
the State.  Support of private homeownership is then a way for the State 
to meet the ‘right’ to housing that emerged along with other civil, 
political and social rights associated with modern citizenship (Saunders 
1990a; 1993).1 
In their rhetoric at least, the Coalition parties have always been 
committed to a liberal sense of ‘individual freedom and free enterprise’ 
(e.g. Liberal Party 2001a), and their positions on homeownership and 
shareownership reflect this overall stance.  Thus, homeownership was a 
central plank in Menzies’ appeal to the ‘forgotten people’ as he 
assembled the internal coalition that became the Liberal Party and then 
led it into its first long term in power (Brett 1992).  This policy was 
materially successful. 
Home ownership was the stake in the country.  What bound the 
residents to their stakes were their mortgages.  The notion was 
that once they had a target, some equity to hang on to or to strive 
for, householders would think and behave like capitalists (Troy 
2000: 720). 
By the late nineteenth century, when class divisions in Australia were 
strong, commentators were already praising ‘the access of working 
people to this form of housing in the working man’s paradise’ (Troy 
2000: 722).  From 1911 to 1947, homeownership in Australia had 
remained at around 50%; but since 1961, when the country had the 
world’s highest levels of private homeownership, it has been steady at 
around 70% (ABS 2002).  The extent to which this shift reflected assent 
to liberalism as such is uncertain. 
                                                           
1 A parallel is seen in citizens ‘rights’ to social welfare, which, in liberal terms, is 
best fulfilled by private participation in the market as shareowners (Anderson 
2002: 214).  Further, critics of various persuasions have denied that social order 
can be explained as a social contract between individual property-owners 
motivated purely by self-interest (e.g. Marshall 1950; Durkheim 1964).  For 
example, Durkheim struggled with the problem of maintaining social solidarity in 
the face of increasing individualism, while critics of market oriented social policy 
argue that it can undercut the communal basis of the polity, as the market operates 
on values at odds with social citizenship (Barbalet 1988: 77; Connell 2002: 7). 
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Parliamentary support for homeownership has been bipartisan, and 
throughout the enactment of his policies on it, Menzies was backed by 
trades union, including some of those under Communist leadership (Troy 
2000: 726).  Nevertheless, the fact remains that he presided over the 
quantum jump in homeownership, as one mark of his successful tapping 
of long-held aspirations in Australia.  Current Coalition policies echo 
those set in place by Menzies.  The First Home Buyers Scheme, for 
example, is explicitly pitched to the ‘Great Australian Dream’ (Liberal 
Party 2001b).   
While levels of shareownership increased rapidly under the previous 
Hawke and Keating Labor governments, Howard has also presided over 
a quantum jump in ownership.  A rise in shareownership that is 
comparable in scale to the rise in homeownership under Menzies has 
occurred during his term in office.  We show this from the results of 
surveys conducted by the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX 2000, 2001).  
It found that in the 1990s the number of direct and indirect shareowners 
in Australia more than tripled, to a combined level of around 52% in 
2000.  ‘Direct ownership’ refers to shares or units in a trust that are 
bought through a broker, received as an inheritance or gift, or allocated 
in a demutualisation or employee share scheme, and ‘indirect ownership’ 
to investment in either a managed fund or a personal superannuation fund 
that is invested partly or wholly in the stock market.  The shift is clear in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Percentages of Adult Australians who were 
Shareowners (Direct and Indirect Combined) 
Month Year % 
December 1991 15 
May 1997 34 
November 2000 52 
Source: ASX 2000. 
As with homeownership, Australians have led the world in their 
enthusiasm for the market.  By 1999, they had the world’s highest levels 
of private shareownership, outstripping even the exemplar of capitalism, 
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the United States.  In Table 2 we show the ASX’s comparison of 
Australia and other countries. 
 
Table 2: Comparative Incidence of Shareownership, November 1999 
Country Direct Total 
Australia 41 54 
Canada 26 52 
USA 32 48 
UK 30 40 
New Zealand 31 38 
Germany 13 25 
Source: ASX 2000. 
Our comparison of Menzies and Howard on the scale of this shift is 
Howard’s own, for he has claimed an aspirational identity between the 
move to shareownership and the earlier rise in homeownership:   
The founder of the Liberal Party, Sir Robert Menzies’, proudest 
boast was that he created the greatest homeowning democracy in 
the world.  It’s my goal to make Australia the greatest share 
owning democracy in the world and I think that is an aspiration 
that many people in middle Australia share ... (Howard 1998). 
The equity held by shareowners defines them as small-scale capitalists, 
and, as Joe Hockey then Minister for Financial Services and Regulation, 
said in a speech on the role of corporate governance in the protection of 
small shareholders, the Coalition aimed at extending capitalism beyond 
the top end of town: 
Owning shares and being involved in issues of corporate 
governance is not about the interests of the trade union 
movement, it’s not about a hobby to fill in spare hours, and it’s 
not about narrow, elitist agendas.  It is about creating wealth for 
Australians and this Government is very focused on that outcome.  
This Government has delivered for Australian shareholders 
(Hockey 2001a). 
6     JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY  No 52 
 
The Coalition fought on that basis in the 2001 election.  Remaining 
‘quite sure that generally speaking the broadest possible share ownership 
we have in Australia is a good thing’, and being ‘heartened by the fact 
that Australia is now the largest share owning democracy in the world’ 
(Howard 2000), Howard stressed his record of ‘encouraging the 
development of a culture of saving and investment from the earliest age 
possible’ (Howard 2001b).  Before and after the election his financial 
ministers reaffirmed that the Coalition was ‘unashamed in its support of 
freely operating market forces’ (Hockey 2001a), and that it was 
committed to a ‘dynamic free enterprise society’ (Campbell 2002). 
As with homeownership, the rising level of shareownership need not 
reflect a widespread commitment to either liberal individualism or 
‘progressive liberalism’ (Argy 1998).  Several indicators show that other 
loyalties and motivations are in play.  As in the current public doubt over 
further privatisation of Telstra, Australians have traditionally looked to a 
blend of public and private ownership (e.g. Braithwaite 1988; Western 
1999).  The rise in private investment began during the Hawke and 
Keating years.  The ALP supported the demutualisations and 
privatisations of the late 1990s that brought millions of new investors to 
the market.  The ACTU has also backed at least some aspects of 
shareownership, as when Sharan Burrow (2000) held that superannuation 
and employee share acquisition schemes meant that unionists should no 
longer see their interests and those of shareholders as necessarily 
opposed.   
Furthermore, to claim a continuity and aspirational identity between 
homeownership and shareownership is to elide differences in economic 
context.  Governments of all persuasions have found that support for 
homeownership is useful in stimulating the economy.  Although this 
micro-economic tinkering remains central to Coalition policy on 
homeownership (e.g. Howard 2001a), quite different dynamics appear in 
policies on shareownership.  These appear to be influenced more by 
continuing fiscal constraints rather than by economic hiccups.  The 
recent focus on the ageing of the Australian population, with its effects of 
a shrinking tax-base and rising demands on health and welfare services, 
is just one example of repeated warnings that the provision of welfare 
cannot be sustained at previous levels.  Against that background, both the 
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Coalition and the ALP have developed policies on self-support in 
retirement: superannuation is one vehicle; shareownership is another.  So 
just as some Communist-led unions in the 1950s backed Menzies on 
homeownership for the creation of jobs in the building industry rather 
than through any commitment to private property, non-Coalition support 
for shareownership may be more a pragmatic response to perceptions of 
fiscal crisis than a sign of conversion to the free market. 
The meanings of shareownership are then imbued with all the uncertainty 
associated with individual ownership and different senses of communal 
belonging and membership.  We focus on two empirically accessible 
issues, the first of which is the electoral effect of shareownership.  If 
Howard is right to identify his electoral success with Australia’s 
emergence as ‘the greatest share owning democracy in the world,’ then, 
to take a broad brush, shareowners should tend to be supporters of the 
Coalition rather than the ALP.  If this effect does appear, however, it 
would suggest a difference between shareownership and homeownership 
as expressions of citizenship, since homeowners’ support for the 
Coalition is at best muted (Troy 2000; McAllister, 1984).   
This suggests our second issue: the civic implications of shareownership, 
or what Troy (2000: 736) called the ‘level of citizen competence’ that it 
entails.  The participatory face of liberalism is clear in Howard’s 
simultaneous aims to create a shareowning democracy and ‘to deepen the 
quality of our community life’ (Howard 1999).  Readers of his speeches 
will know how often he appeals to the notion of ‘the community.’  Here 
he echoes Menzies, who designed his policy on homeownership ‘to 
produce a patriotic, co-operative and cohesive society’ which was also 
‘docile and compliant’ (Troy 2000: 718).  Yet, while Liberal politicians 
have sought to influence political behaviour by encouraging ownership, 
perhaps successfully, evidence in support for the position that civic 
engagement is enhanced by home or shareownership is scarce.  Both 
Barbalet (1988) and Marshall (1950: 122) have pointed out 
contradictions between capitalism and citizenship, while the tensions in 
Coalition policy in relation to shareholders identified by Troy (2000) 
suggest that ownership may constrain, rather than deepen, community 
engagement.  Free market principles of competition, and shareowner 
concerns over ‘bottom lines’ and dividend payments, appear to be at 
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odds with notions of mutual obligation, and the norms of reciprocity 
implicit in community engagement (Putnam 2000, 20).2   
On the face of it, then, we should expect shareowners to be less active in 
civic organisations than non-owners, and to be also less active compared 
to homeowners.  Counting against these expectations, however, is 
evidence that the civically engaged tend to have higher incomes, and to 
be well educated (Putnam 2000: 94), both correlates of shareownership 
and homeownership (Tranter and White 2001).  These findings muddy 
the waters somewhat, and introduce confounding influences to our 
expectations. 
While a certain amount of evidence does link homeownership with 
increased levels of civic or communal participation (Saunders 1990a: 
1993), other researchers have warned against ‘the glib association of 
homeownership with responsible citizenship, social stability and 
industrial peace’ (Winter 1994: 6).  Similarly, if the ‘principle of 
economic survival of the fittest operates in all competitive markets’ 
(Hockey 2001b), then it is hard to square Howard’s ‘community’ with 
his fostering of shareownership.  The investors red in tooth and claw that 
Hockey evokes seem more likely to go ‘bowling alone’ (Putnam 2000) 
than to deepen their civic engagement and the quality of community life.  
The only way to ascertain the veracity of these claims regarding 
associations between ownership and civic participation is therefore to 
subject them to empirical scrutiny.  We return to these issues in the final 
section of this article. 
Data 
Data from a large national survey, the 2001 Australian Election Study 
(AES) (Bean et al. 2002), allows us to test these expectations.3  The AES 
                                                           
2 Putnam (2000, 20) explains that reciprocity can be specific: “I’ll do this for you if 
you do that for me” or generalized: “I’ll do this for you without expecting anything 
specific back from you, in the confident expectation that someone else will do 
something for me down the road”. 
3 AES data were obtained from the Australian Social Science Data Archive in the 
Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University. 
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was conducted via mail-out to a nationally representative sample.  The 
number of cases, 2010, represents a response rate of 55%.   The survey 
included questions on homeownership and shareownership, on party 
voting, and on behaviour that we construe as measures of civic 
engagement.   
The data on both forms of ownership have a certain face validity.  For 
homeownership, we checked the AES results by comparing the 
distribution of housing tenures found there with figures reported by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS).  This comparison is shown in 
Table 3. 
 





Outright Homeownership 38.4 41.9 
Home under Purchase 32.2 32.3 
Private Rental 20.1 11.7 
Public Rental 5.6 4.1 
Other 3.7 10.0 
Sources: ABS 2002; Bean et al. (2002). 
The ABS and AES estimates for mortgagees are almost identical.  
However, the AES appears to have slightly over-sampled outright 
homeowners, but under-sampled private renters substantially, while the 
‘other’ category is much larger than the ABS survey estimates.  In order 
to adjust for these discrepancies, we weighted the AES data according to 
estimates from the ABS Survey of Income and Housing Costs for 1999-
2000 (see Appendix for details).  We then proceeded to operationalise 
housing tenure in the statistical (regression) models by contrasting public 
renters, private renters, and those who have a mortgage, with outright 
homeowners. 
The AES question on shareownership read: ‘Do you own shares in any 
company listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (shares registered in 
your name or that of your family company)?’  That is, the question 
referred to ‘direct ownership’ under the ASX’s definition.  It resulted in 
an estimated proportion of 44.5%; whereas the figure from the closest 
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ASX survey conducted in 2000, was 40%.  We note the slight 
discrepancy with these estimates, but take the figures as roughly 
comparable.  Further, since another question in the AES asked 
respondents who did own shares to indicate the year in which they first 
entered the market, we can distinguish between those who were 
shareholders before Howard assumed office in 1996 and those who 
started investing later. 
Finally, we operationalised four measures of civic engagement.  As 
Putnam (2000: 49) puts it, ‘membership in formal organisations is only 
one facet of social capital, but it is usually regarded as a useful barometer 
of community involvement’.  Bearing this in mind, we used a question 
from the AES: ‘Are you an active member of any of the following 
voluntary organisations, an inactive member or not a member?’  We 
selected sport or recreational organisations, art, music or educational 
organisations, and charitable organisations as measures of civic 
participation.4  We also included a variable to measure participation in a 
variety of important Australian organisations currently suffering a 
decline in membership – the trades union.   
Analysis 
The AES data were analysed with SAS version 8.  In the first phase of 
the analysis we used logistic regression to predict political behaviour on 
the basis of homeownership and shareownership.  The dependent 
variable - major party voting in the House of Representatives – was 
modeled in binary terms (i.e. Coalition versus Labor with other responses 
omitted).  In the later part of the article, we examine participation in 
voluntary organisations.  We contrast active members with non-members 
of sporting, cultural and charitable organisations.   In addition, we 
consider membership of trades union as another aspect of civic 
                                                           
4 We omitted the fourth organisation listed in the AES - professional organisations - 
from our analyses.  As professional organisations is a somewhat vague concept, 
and as their membership overlaps with the membership of trades union, we 
decided to analyse trades union membership as a more valid measure of civic 
participation. 
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participation, again on the basis of home and shareownership, with 
appropriate controls.   
Because shareownership and homeownership are positively correlated, 
that is homeowners tend to also be shareowners, and owning houses and 
shares are both associated with higher incomes (Tranter and White 
2001), we adopted a multivariate approach (i.e. multiple logistic 
regression).  The advantage of such an approach is that the net, or 
separate effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable 
can be estimated, when we hold constant or statistically ‘control’ for 
other independent variables in the regression model (Fielding and Gilbert 
2000: 271). 
Key control variables are included in all regression models, including a 
dummy variable to control for gendered differences in voting and civic 
participation (men versus women), and age measured in its natural 
metric.  We also included tertiary education and high income ($70,000+ 
per annum) as control variables.  The controls are important, as they are 
all predictors of home ownership and/or shareownership (Tranter and 
White 2001).  By adopting a multivariate analysis we are able to estimate 
the net, or separate effects of owning shares, and of housing tenure on 
voting behaviour (and civic participation), when the possible 
confounding impact of income and other socio-demographic influences 
is held constant.   
A measure of social class is also added as a control to our regression 
models.  Even in the so called ‘home owning democracy’ of Australia, 
class is strongly related to housing tenure, with middle class people much 
more likely than working class people to own their own homes (Rex and 
Moore 1967; Merrett 1979; Ball 1983; Saunders 1990b).  Class is also 
clearly associated with owning shares, as indicated by the fact that higher 
income earners, and the well educated, are overrepresented among 
shareowners (Tranter and White 2001).  Capturing the multidimensional 
nature of class relations using survey data is somewhat problematic, 
although there are several precedents.  The Neo-Marxist, Eric Wright 
(1985), for example, constructs complex class models on the basis of 
occupational location, employee supervisory status and organisational 
size, while the Neo-Weberian, John Goldthorpe (1987), operationalises 
class in occupational terms.   
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We decided to adopt a parsimonious approach.  Rather than considering 
the ‘objective’ class location of respondents using complex models of 
class that involve the introduction of several independent variables to the 
regression equation, we employed self-identified class location - a 
‘subjective’ measure.5  As such, a single dummy variable was 
constructed to contrast the self-identified ‘upper’ and ‘middle’ classes, 
with those claiming ‘working’ class, or no class location. 
As all of our dependent variables are dichotomous, and as we wish to 
explore relationships between them and several independent variables 
using a multivariate strategy, multiple logistic regression analysis is an 
appropriate technique (Long 1997).  We presented odds ratios in the 
regression tables in order to facilitate interpretation of the regression 
estimates.6 
                                                           
5 The questions from the 2001 AES was: “Which social class would you say you 
belong to? Upper class; Middle class; Working class; None’.  While one could 
debate the advantages of employing ‘objective’ versus ‘subjective’ measures of 
class for our purposes, the two are associated strongly (Kelley and Evans 1995).  
We therefore chose the most parsimonious model. 
6 The regression results presented in Tables 4-7 are odds ratios (OR), calculated on 
the basis of the values of the independent variables.  As these are multiple 
regression estimates, the odds ratios are adjusted to control for the influence of all 
other independent variables in each model, so they are net effects.  Independent 
variables are of two types, ‘dummy’ variables (scored 1 or 0) and scale variables 
(i.e. age in years).  Dummy variable odds ratios are interpretable in comparison to 
reference categories.  For example, considering Table 4, Model 2, those who own 
shares in one company, are 1.6 times more likely than the reference category (i.e. 
those who don’t own shares) to vote for the Coalition, rather than for Labor.  An 
OR less than 1 would indicate an estimate that is smaller than the reference 
category.  For example, those in public rental accommodation are approximately 
4.5 times less likely  (i.e. 1 ÷ 0.22 = 4.545) than outright homeowners to vote 
Coalition as opposed to Labor.  The estimates for the control variable ‘age’ are the 
log odds of voting (or participating) for a unit change in age (i.e. one year).  For 
example, in Table 5, Model 2, the estimate for age is larger than 1, indicating that 
older people are more likely to vote for the Coalition.  Alternatively, the smaller 
than unity estimate for age in Table 7 for sporting participation suggests that 
younger people are more likely to be active in sporting organisations.  
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Electoral Effects 
The electoral effects of homeownership and shareownership are first 
examined in Table 4.  Those who own shares in one company, two to 
five companies, and six or more companies, are contrasted with non-
share owners.  For housing tenure, public renters, private renters, and 
mortgagers are compared with outright homeowners.  We present the 
results of four models predicting voting for the Coalition as opposed to 
Labor in the House of Representatives.  Model 1 contrasts various 
aspects of housing tenure, model 2 examines shareowners, model 3 
includes all variables from models 1 and 2, and in model 4 controls are 
introduced (i.e. sex, age, education, income, class). 
 
Table 4: Coalition versus Labor Voting (Odds Ratios) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Public Rental 0.2*** - 0.3*** 0.4** 
Private Rental 0.7 - 0.9 1.2 
Mortgage 0.8 - 0.9 1.0 
Owners (reference) 1 - 1 1 
Shares     
1 Company - 1.6** 1.5** 1.4* 
2-5 Companies - 2.2*** 2.0*** 1.9*** 
6 or more Companies - 3.3*** 2.9*** 2.7*** 
Non-owner - 1 1 1 
Men - - - 1.0 
Age (years) - - - 1.007 
Degree - - - 0.5*** 
Income $70K+ - - - 1.2 
Middle Class - - - 2.3*** 
Pseudo r-squared .03 .05 .07 .14 
Notes:  * p<.05; ** p <.01; *** <.001 
For the dependent variable, Voting in House of Representatives: 
1= Liberal Party Vote + National Party Vote; 2= Australian Labor Party Vote. 
Source: Australian Election Study 2001 
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The odds ratios in model 1 suggest that those living in private rental 
accommodation, and those who have a mortgage, are no more likely than 
homeowners to vote for the Coalition rather than Labor.  This is 
consistent with McAllister’s (1984) earlier finding that housing tenure 
had little impact on political behaviour in Australia.  The only exception 
here is for people living in public rental housing, who are more than five 
times as likely to vote for the Australian Labor Party, as opposed to the 
Coalition.  On the whole though, our results are consistent with Troy’s 
(2000) report on the electoral neutrality of homeownership.   
The second model, however, shows that shareowners are from one and a 
half to three times as likely as non-shareowners to vote for the Coalition.  
They also show that the likelihood of Coalition voting increases with the 
number of companies invested in.  These results remain largely 
unchanged when we control for other influences (model 4).  The 
magnitude of the r-squared statistics indicates that neither of the models 
(i.e. 1 or 2) ‘explain’ much variation in voting behaviour, although the r-
squared of .05 for model 2 suggests that shareownership is a better 
predictor of voting than housing tenure (r-squared .03).7  Age is an 
important control variable in this context, as outright homeownership and 
shareownership are assets that take time to accumulate, while the other 
control variables are important correlates of our independent variables.  
However, sex, age and income have no substantive, or statistically 
significant impact upon voting, although education and class effects are 
apparent.8  Those with a tertiary education are about twice as likely to 
vote for Labor as opposed to the Coalition, while the middle class are 
more than twice as likely as the working class to vote for the Coalition. 
Howard then does seem to have tapped a constituency among 
shareowners.  His success here, however, belies the continuity he 
                                                           
7 We report ‘pseudo’ r-squared statistics here with the logistic regression models.  
These are analogous to the coefficient of determination (r-squared) for ordinary 
least squares regression analysis.  The r-squared statistic indicates the proportion 
of the variance in the dependent variable that is accounted for, or ‘explained’ by all 
of the independent variables in a given multiple regression model. 
8 Income does have an impact on voting behaviour, with high earners more 
supportive of the Coalition than Labor.  However, the income effects are largely 
mediated through social class in these regression models.  
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claimed from Menzies’ homeowning democracy to his own shareowning 
democracy, for the two forms of ownership have quite different effects.  
Before we examine whether this difference is reflected in different forms 
of civic engagement, we check for differences in voting behaviour 
between investors who entered the market before and after Howard took 
office in 1996.  In this phase of the analysis we take non-ownership of 
shares, ownership since 1997 and ownership prior to 1997 as 
independent variables, as well as the standard controls (Table 5).  The 
dependent variable is voting in the House of Representatives, as above. 
 
Table 5: Coalition versus Labor Voting, among Non-shareholders 
and among Shareholders who Purchased Shares before and after 
Howard’s Assumption of Office (Odds Ratios) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Shareownership   
Don’t Own Shares 0.5*** 0.5*** 
Owned Shares Since 1997 1 1 
Owned Shares Prior to 1997 1.0 1.0 
Controls   
Men  - 1.0 
Age (years) - 1.010* 
Degree - 0.5*** 
Income $70K+ - 1.2 
Middle Class - 2.3*** 
Pseudo r-squared .04 .11 
Notes: * p<.05; ** p <.01; *** <.001 
For the dependent variable, Voting in House of Representatives:  
1= Liberal Party Vote + National Party Vote; 2= Australian Labor Party Vote. 
Source: Australian Election Study 2001 
As should be expected from the first phase of the analysis, non-
shareowners were only half as likely to vote for the Coalition, with a 
high degree of statistical significance.  The more interesting result is the 
virtual identity in voting behaviour between early and late entrants to the 
market (OR 1:1).  Even when we introduce our controls, these effects 
remain unchanged.  While we see no evidence of the influence of 
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Howard Government policy on shareowner voting in Table 5, in the next 
table we extend the analyses in order to consider the following questions.  
How do shareowners vote before entering the market?  That is, are they 
more likely to have voted for the Coalition prior to owning shares?  
Further, to what extent does owning shares influence voting behaviour?   
 
Table 6: Coalition versus Labor Voting in 1998 and 2001 House of 
Representatives Elections (Odds Ratios) 
 1998 2001 
Shareownership   
Don’t own shares  1  1 
Owned shares prior to 1999  1.8***  1.7*** 
Owned shares from 1999  1.7**  2.5*** 
Controls   
Men   1.0  1.0 
Age (years)  1.004  1.010* 
Degree  0.5***  0.5*** 
Income $70K+  1.3*  1.2 
Middle Class  2.1***  2.3*** 
Pseudo r-squared  .10  .12 
Notes: * p<.05; ** p <.01; *** <.001 
For the Dependent variable Voting in House of Representatives:  
1= Liberal Party Vote + National Party Vote; 2= Australian Labor Party Vote. 
Source: Australian Election Study 2001 
In order to consider these questions we compared voting in the House of 
Representatives at the 2001 election with voting in the previous Federal 
election held in 1998.9  Apart from the usual control variables, we 
included two dummy variables to represent those who owned shares up 
to and including 1998, and those who entered the share market in 1998 or 
after.  We contrast these two types of shareowners with non-owners in 
Table 6.   The results indicate that shareowners at the 1998 election and 
                                                           
9 Voting at the 1998 federal election was based on the following question from the 
2001 Australian Election Study: ‘In the last Federal election in October 1998, 
when Labor was led by Kim Beazley and the Liberals by John Howard, which 
party got your first preference then in the House of Representatives election?’  
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those who entered the market after the 1998 election displayed very 
similar voting patterns.  Both groups were almost twice as likely as non-
shareowners to vote for the Coalition.  However, at the 2001 election, the 
most recent shareowners had an even greater propensity to vote for the 
Coalition than those who had entered the market earlier.  Recent 
shareowners were 2.5 times as likely as non-owners to vote for the 
Coalition, compared to 1.7 for those who were in the market prior to 
1998. 
These are important findings for two reasons.  They indicate that those 
who buy shares are for the most part Coalition voters prior to entering the 
share market – it tends to be those who hold ‘Liberal’ values that 
purchase shares.  Further, when these people do buy into the share 
market, their likelihood of voting for the Coalition increases even further.  
This has important implications for understanding political behaviour in 
Australia, particularly in light of the substantial increases in 
shareownership over the last decade.  These results are further reason for 
Labor politicians to abandon the notion of a ‘stakeholder democracy’ 
(Latham 2001), if indeed this is still considered seriously.  From a Labor 
perspective, increasing the opportunity for new participants to enter the 
share market will not only attract the wrong type of people (i.e. mainly 
Coalition voters), but once they are in they will become even more 
conservative in their voting behaviour.  These results suggest that those 
who rode the wave of demutualisations and privatisations of the late 
1990s were already part of Howard’s constituency.  In that case, they 
should be expected to display the tensions in civic engagement discussed 
above.  We examine this in the next phase of the analysis. 
Civic Participation 
To test the relationship between homeowenership, shareownership and 
civic engagement, we took the housing tenure and shareownership 
dummy variables as independent variables and active membership in 
three types of voluntary organisations, and membership of trades union, 
as dependent variables (Table 7).  Once again, we included the same 
controls.  Controlling for income is important, as participation in sporting 
and charitable organisations may be limited by access to economic 
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resources.  Further, (tertiary) education, and social class as indicators of 
cultural capital (Bourdieu 1977) should be related to participation in 
cultural organisations (Putnam 2000) while, as mentioned earlier, both 
education and income are important predictors of shareownership itself 
(Tranter and White 2001).   
Table 7: Civic Participation, Housing Tenure  
and Shareownership (Odds Ratios) 
 Members versus Non-members 
 Sporting Cultural Charitable Union 
Controls     
Men 1.6*** 0.4*** 0.8 1.3* 
Age 0.989* 1.006 1.018** 1.004 
Degree 0.9 2.9*** 2.0*** 1.7** 
Income $70K+ 0.9 0.5** 0.7 1.0 
Middle Class 2.0*** 2.8*** 1.6** 0.8 
Housing Tenure     
Public Rental 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Private Rental 0.8 1.0 1.3 0.6** 
Mortgage 1.1 0.8 0.7 1.2 
Owners (reference) 1 1 1 1 
Shareownership     
1 company 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.5* 
2-5 companies 1.5* 1.1 1.3 1.2 
6 or more Companies 2.0** 1.6 1.5 0.7 
Non-owner 1 1 1 1 
Pseudo r-squared .12 .14 .08 .05 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p <.01; *** <.001 
The first three dependent variables derived from the question: ‘Are you an active member 
of any of the following voluntary organisations, an inactive member or not a member?’ 
(Sport or recreation organisation; Art, music or educational organisation [Cultural]; 
Charitable organisation).  Civic organisations dependent variables scored: 1= Active in 
Organisation; 2= Non-member.  Trades union membership dependent variable: ‘Do you 
belong to a trade union? ’ scored 1=Yes; 2=No. 
Source: Australian Election Study 2001 
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Gender does have significant effects here, and along predictable lines 
(e.g. Baldock 1998; Putnam 2000), in that men are more likely to be 
active in sporting clubs and women to focus on cultural activities.  
Otherwise, the more general lesson from Table 7 is that civic 
participation is less strongly associated with homeownership than 
shareownership.  Housing tenure has no substantive or statistically 
significant effect on any participation variable, other than trades union 
membership where the evidence suggests that renters are much less 
likely to be members of a trade union than home owners.  However, 
shareownership does appear to be associated with some measures of 
civic participation.  Since shareownership is correlated positively with 
membership of sporting associations, shareowners can hardly be said to 
be ‘bowling alone’ (Putnam 2000).  Their propensity for engagement in 
cultural and charitable organizations, however, is less notable, and not 
statistically significant.  As with voting, the likelihood of shareholders 
being members of community organisations is highest among those who 
own shares in six or more companies.  Those owning shares in only one 
company do not differ statistically from non-owners on any form of civic 
participation, with the exception of belonging to trades union.10 
Conclusions 
We have sought to address three questions: whether there are electoral 
implications associated with increases in shareownership, whether 
homeownership and shareownership imply different expressions of ‘civic 
engagement’, and whether rising shareownership may be contributing to 
a weakening rather than a deepening of ‘the quality of community life’.  
On the basis of our analysis of AES 2001 data we can answer ‘yes’ to the 
first and second questions, but the answer to the last question is less 
                                                           
10 However, an interesting pattern emerged when we considered the statistical 
interactions between homeownership and shareownership.  We included dummy 
variables in the regression models to measure homeowners who also owned shares 
in one company, two to five companies, and six or more companies respectively.  
Homeowners who owned shares in one company were much more likely to be 
members of cultural organisations (OR 6.6) and charitable organisations (OR 3.8), 
in both cases at a high level of statistical significance, although the other 
interaction variables were not significant at the .05 level. 
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clear-cut.  John Howard has certainly presided over what at first glance 
appears to be a major shift in Australia’s political economy, and those 
who have entered the share market since he has been in office are 
certainly more likely to support him.  But despite a common grounding 
in the private ‘ownership’ that underpins the policies of his government, 
homeownership and shareownership seem to entail different dynamics. 
The continuity that Howard claims from Menzies’ homeowning 
democracy to his own shareowning democracy does not seem 
sustainable.  To judge by participation levels in charitable organisations, 
the link that Howard sees between holding an economic ‘stake in the 
country’ and a deepening of ‘the quality of community life’ is open to 
question.  Just as sales of public housing may sharpen social divisions 
between home purchasers and renters (Winter 1994), so the privatisations 
and demutualisations that brought millions of new investors to the 
market may deepen rather than alleviate class divisions between 
shareowners and non-shareowners (Connell 2002).  The quality of 
community life may be further undermined in the future as the middle 
classes increasingly pay for private schools, and health and pension plans 
to match their investment in homes and shares.  As public investment 
declines the marginalised minority may ‘find themselves shut out of 
many other areas of private provision’ (Saunders 1990a: 370). 
While we can confirm the suspicions that we took from Troy (2000) as 
our starting-point, our analysis also raises many questions.  For example, 
while there appears to be an electoral payoff for the Coalition in trying to 
encourage new entrants to the stock market, it is not clear if the rise in 
shareownership is part of a continuing trend, or if it has already peaked.  
If the latter, the political payoff may be limited.  For Howard the 
chairmanship of the International Democratic Union befits his role as the 
leader of the world’s ‘greatest shareowning democracy’.  But this may 
well be a poisoned chalice under current market conditions.  To frame a 
polity in terms of shareownership is to give hostages to fortune.  No 
national government can be relaxed and comfortable when unscrupulous 
corporate executives elsewhere, for example in the United States, have 
the potential to undermine its legitimacy.  Millions of inexperienced 
investors have lost money, both nominally and actually, from market 
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crashes in 2002, and the electoral ramifications of this phenomenon have 
yet to emerge. 
Further, while our analysis indicates that shareholders tend to be civically 
engaged, we have not taken account of another form of civic 
participation - shareholder activism.11  This was rising in salience even 
before the recent collapses in the market.  Focused on issues such as the 
triple bottom line of financial, environmental and social returns, ethical 
investment, corporate social responsibility, or corporate citizenship, and 
generating as much contention as support, this is an emerging arena for 
civic disputes (e.g. Bosch 2000; Elkington 1998; Ethical Investment 
Association 2001; Henderson 2001; McLean 2001; Rose 2001; 
Shareholders’ Project 2001; Wheeler 1998).  Governmental action on 
corporate governance has been one response to this, and if it continues 
then the deregulated free market will become increasingly re-regulated.    
So while the Coalition has so far benefited electorally from the surge in 
shareownership, this shift in Australia’s political economy has left it with 
potential problems to resolve.  Bad news for the Coalition, however, is 
not necessarily good news for Labor.  In particular, Mark Latham, the 
Shadow Treasurer, has been urging the party to support shareownership 
as part of the ‘third way’ beyond the old ideologies of left and right.  He 
has called for a ‘stakeholder policy’ for Australia to fulfill its ‘potential 
as a sharemarket democracy,’ where all ‘citizens should have a stake in 
the market economy’ (Latham 2001: 26).  Latham’s proposals were first 
met with suspicion within the party and the union movement, and later 
with outright rejection.  Our findings on the electoral implications of 
shareownership might well give him and his allies further cause to 
reconsider their position.  
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Appendix 
Australian Election Study data were adjusted so that the proportions of 
housing tenure agreed with estimates from the Survey of Income and 
Housing Costs (1999-2000), administered by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics.  We calculated separate weights for each state and territory in 
order to achieve a nationally representative sample, on the basis of 
housing tenure. 
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The weights for each state were calculated by dividing each ABS 
proportion by the AES proportion (e.g. for Owners in NSW: 39.8 ÷ 43.1 
=0.92343387).  The weighting variable was then used in the calculations 
of regression estimates in Tables 4-7.  
 
 ABS AES Weight ABS AES Weight 
 % %  % %  
 NSW Victoria 
Owners 39.8 43.1 0.92343387 43.6 41.5 1.05060241 
Mortgage 30.5 29.8 1.02348993 32 33.5 0.95522388 
Public Rental 5.9 4.8 1.22916667 4.1 2.7 1.51851852 
Private Rental 21 13.2 1.59090909 17 10.7 1.58878505 
Other 2.8 9.1 0.30769231 3.3 11.6 0.28448276 
       
 Queensland South Australia 
Owners 34.6 43.1 0.80278422 37.5 40.5 0.92592593 
Mortgage 31.7 32.8 0.96646341 32 35.7 0.89635854 
Public Rental 4.7 2.6 1.80769231 9.5 5.4 1.75925926 
Private Rental 24.7 12.1 2.04132231 16.7 9.5 1.75789474 
Other 4.3 9.4 0.45744681 4.3 8.9 0.48314607 
       
 Western Australia Tasmania 
Owners 31.5 37.6 0.83776596 41.7 47.5 0.87789474 
Mortgage 37.9 36 1.05277778 30.3 25.4 1.19291339 
Public Rental 5.4 5.3 1.01886792 6.5 6.8 0.95588235 
Private Rental 20 8.5 2.35294118 17 10.2 1.66666667 
Other 5.2 12.6 0.41269841 4.5 10.1 0.44554455 
       
 ACT Northern Territory 
Owners 25.8 35.7 0.72268908 17.7 12.5 1.416 
Mortgage 42.4 35.7 1.18767507 38.3 50 0.766 
Public Rental 10.2 9.5 1.07368421 9.4 12.5 0.752 
Private Rental 19.4 16.7 1.16167665 22.4 25 0.896 
Other 2.2 2.4 0.91666667 12.2 - - 
 
